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STATE CAPTURE: IS IT A CRIME?
HOW THE WORLD PERCEIVED IT
Lily Evelina Sitorus
AbstractState. capture. has. emerged. as. a. global. threat. in. several. countries.. The.
definitions vary from the act of rent-seeking to  corruption. Russia, Ukraine, and.some.countries.in.Central.Asia.are.several.areas..where.state.capture.
was first observed. Indonesia is not immune from the threat. Several misconducts. in. the. country. had. already. been. labeled. as. state. capture..There. are. some. distinctions. between. state. capture. and. corruption,.whereas. in.a. few.countries.both.are.considered.as.the.same..Strategies.for.combating.corruption.usually.involve.reducing.state.capture..
Introduction In.common.understanding,.corruption.is.often.referred.to.either.as.bribery.practice.or.as.major.embezzlement/plundering.of.public.monies..There.is.also.a.third.form.of.corruption,.less.known.but.still.very.pervasive,.found.often.but.not.exclusively.in.transition.countries:.state.capture..State. capture. has. evolved. from. being. contested. as. the. lead. factor. in.corruption. in. the. Former. Soviet. Union. in. its. early. days. of. the. discussion,. to.increasingly.being.re-examined.with.more.scepticism.as.to.its.actual.prevalence.and.its.status.as.the.leading.type.of.corruption.in.the.region.
1. Definitions
When we think about corruption, an image quickly comes to mind a. bureaucrat. extorting. bribes. from. powerless. individuals. and. defenceless.
firms simply to enable them to “get things done.” Behind this view lies an understanding.of.the.state.extracting.rents.from.the.economy.for.the.exclusive.
benefit of politicians and bureaucrats.Joel. Hellman. and. Daniel. Kaufmann. (2001). said. that. in. transition.economies,.corruption.has.taken.on.a.new.image—that.of.so-called.oligarchs.manipulating.policy.formation.and.even.shaping.the.emerging.rules.of.the.game.to.their.own.very.substantial.advantage..They.refer.to.this.behaviour.as.state 
capture.2..
‘State capture’ was also defined by Vesna Pesic (2007) as any group 
or social strata, external to the state, that seizes decisive influence over state institutions. and. policies. for. its. own. interests. and. against. the. public. good.3.1.The.author.currently.works.in.the.Directorate.of.Intellectual.Property.Rights,.Ministry.of.Justice.and.Human.Rights,. Republic. of. Indonesia.. The. author.welcomes. all. comments. at. lily_eve2001@yahoo.com. 2. Joel. Hellman. and. Daniel. Kaufmann. (2001).. Confronting. the. Challenge. of. State. Capture. in.Transition.Economies,.Finance.&.Development..Volume.38.Number.3.from.http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm3 Vesna Pesic (2007). State Capture and Widespread Corruption in Serbia. CEPS Working Document No..262/March.2007.from.http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1309
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Teten.Masduki,.one.of.the.major.players.for.combating.corruption.in.Indonesia.also.has.a.similar.view.that.state.capture.is.a.policy..made.to.the.advantage.of.entrepreneurs.4..Anne. Lugon-Moulin. (2010). in. understanding. state. capture. said. that. it.occurs.when.the.ruling.elite.and/or.powerful.businessmen.manipulate.policy.
formation and influence the emerging rules of the game (including laws and economic.regulations).to.their.own.advantage.5..In.recognising.the.problem.of.state.capture,.Helmann.and.Kaufmann.put.
their effort on the complex interactions between firms and the state. Particularly, 
they emphasized the importance of mechanisms through which firms seek to 
shape decisions taken by the state to gain specific advantages, often through the imposition.of.anticompetitive.barriers.that.generate.highly.concentrated.gains.to.
selected powerful firms at a significant social cost. Because such firms use their 
influence to block any policy reforms that might eliminate these advantages, state.capture.has.become.not.merely.a.symptom.but.also.a.fundamental.cause.of.poor.governance.6.The.dangers. to. the. long-term.development.of. such.a. capture. economy.are.self-evident..New,.dynamic.entrepreneurs.have.strong.incentives.to.invest.their. talents. in. capturing. the. state. rather. than. in. developing. innovative.products.or.production.methods,.in.order.to.compete.successfully.in.a.distorted.environment..In.a.way,.Helmann.and.Kaufmann.said.that.the.capture.economy.rewards.
connections over competence and influence over innovation; it is fuelled by. private. investments. in. politics. that. weaken. the. state. and. undermine. the.
provision of basic public goods. At the same time, they also find that capture economy. systematically. deters. private. economic. investments,. both. foreign.and.domestic,.and.creates.obstacles. to. the.entry.of. small-.and.medium-sized.enterprises.(SMEs),.undermining.the.key.sources.of.sustainable.growth.7.In.the.absence.of.access.to.government.decision.making.through.collective.
representatives, firms are compelled to seek informal, one-on-one relationships 
with individual state officials to represent their interests. A number of key writings.on.the.topic.suggest.the.roots.of.state.capture.extend.from.partial.civil.liberties,. lack. of. transparency,. competition,. and. insecurity. of. property. rights..
The lack of transparency tends to go hand in hand with insufficient competition 
among firms and other constituencies to influence the state’s deliberative processes.. Fostering. competition. in. the. economy. and. in. the.marketplace. for.
political influence is the main challenge in preventing and combating state capture.8.
2. ModesThere.are.several.modes.of.state.capture.present.in.every.country..Even.
the definitions vary. The common understanding is that state capture and legal 
4.Lily.Evelina.Sitorus.(2009)..Release.and.Discharge.sebagai.Altenatif.Penyelesaian.Masalah..(Studi.Banding.Kasus.Kebijakan.Penyelesaian.BLBI)..Tesis:.FISIP.UI.5.Anne.Lugon-Moulin,.Understanding.State.Capture..Freedom.from.Fear.Magazine.from.http://www.freedomfromfearmagazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=233:understanding-state-capture&catid=49:issue-6&Itemid=1616.Hellman.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.7.Ibid.8.Ibid.
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corruption are one and the same. While most types of corruption are directed toward.changing.how.existing.laws,.rules,.or.regulations.are.implemented.with.
respect to the bribe payer, state capture refers to corrupt efforts to influence how.those.laws,.rules,.and.regulations.are.formed.9.
The.high-capture.group.includes.countries.regarded.as.partial.reformers.in. both. political. and. economic. terms.. Although. they. have.made. progress. in.liberalisation. and. privatisation,. they. have. been. much. slower. to. enact. the.complementary.institutional.reforms.to.support.the.emergence.of.markets.State.capture.can.be.distinguished.between.types.of.institutions.subject.to.capture.(Legislative,.Executive,.Judiciary,.regulatory.agencies,.or.public.works.ministries). and. the. types. of. actors. actively. seeking. to. capture. (large. private.
firms, political leaders, high ranking officials, or interest groups).10.Concentration.of.both.economic.and.political.power.is.also.likely.to.lead.to.serious.state.capture,.which.usually.goes.hand.in.hand.with.a.weak.civil.society,.according. to. Helmann. and. Kaufmann.. Bribes. to. parliamentarians. to. “buy”.
their votes on important pieces of legislation, bribes to government officials to 
enact favourable regulations or decrees, and bribes to judges to influence court decisions—these.are.the.classic.examples.of.grand.corruption.through.which.
firms can encode advantages for themselves into the basic legal and regulatory structure.of.the.economy.In.most.transition.economies,. the.mechanisms.through.which.the.state.deliberates.on.the.formation.of.laws,.rules,.and.decrees.are.still.largely.hidden.from. public. view.. The. use. of. public. hearings. and. the. Internet. to. provide. a.transparent. forum. for. open. decision. making. is. rare.. Draft. laws. are. seldom.published.for.discussion..Transcripts.of.deliberations.are.not.available.for.public.perusal..The.voting.records.of.individual.legislators.are.not.made.available.to.the.public..9.Ibid.10.Anne.Lugon-Moulin..Loc..Cit.
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At.the.same.time,.the.institutional.tools.that.various.constituencies.can.use.to.gain.access.to.the.state’s.deliberations.are.very.limited..Political.parties.are.weak..Trade.associations,.interest.groups,.and.collective.organisations.lack.
the resources and experience to influence policy.11.Due.to.the.fact,.Helmann.and.Kaufmann.saw.few.transition.countries.have.
sufficient safeguards to ensure proper disclosure of efforts to influence public 
officials, creating an environment highly susceptible to capture. Firms have little 
incentive to report their political contributions, and public officials face few or no.real.sanctions.for.accepting.such.contributions..In.that.matter,.periodic.public.declarations.of.assets.and.income.sources.
by government officials (and at times by their dependents) are now required in. many. transition. countries,. but. the. relevant. implementation. mechanisms.
remain quite weak. Conflict-of-interest rules are poorly understood and barely enforced..Public. interest.watchdog.groups.have. little. capacity. to.monitor. the.
flow of funds from firms to politicians.Case.to.the.point.in.Indonesia,.even.if.the.Ministry.of.Communication.and.Information.had.already.released.the.proper.legislation.for.public.transparency,12.
the implementation of it is hard to reach. When the mark up of police account happens,.the.party.concerned.based.in.this.law.asks.for.police.transparency.but.it.is.usually.rejected.13.Helmann. and. Kaufmann. research. found. that. in. the. capture. economy,.
political influence is monopolised by powerful firms at different levels of government,.with.minimal.checks.and.balances.exerted.by.collective.interests..In. several. transition. countries,. the. monopolisation. of. political. channels. of.
influence reflects the underlying structure of the economy—in particular where the.high.concentration.of.natural.resources.in.national.output.creates.a.highly.
unequal distribution of power across different firms and different sectors.In. other. countries,.
such monopolisation reflects continued. restrictions. on. the.extent. of. political. competition..The. state-capture. index. is.systematically.lower.in.countries.that. have. pursued. more.comprehensive.economic.reform..Furthermore,. at. any. given. pace.of. economic. reform,. there. is. a.dramatic.decline.in.state.capture.in.countries.with.higher.levels.of.civil. liberties..Yet,. it. is.clear. that.the.causal.links.between.capture.and.reform.run.in.both.directions,.which.makes.breaking.out.of.the.
vicious circle so difficult.14.
11.Hellman.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.12.UU.No.14.Tahun.2008.(Law.Number.14.Year.2008).13 ICW Ajukan Sengketa Informasi soal Rekening Gendut Pati Polri (ICW asked for police account transparency). from. http://antikorupsi.org/antikorupsi/?q=content/18862/icw-ajukan-sengketa-informasi-soal-rekening-gendut-pati-polri14.Hellmann.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.
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 Anne Lugon-Moulin presented as example how captor firms can receive extra.advantages.not.only.in.the.form.of.sales.increases,.but.also.in.the.provision.of.public.goods,.such.as.property.rights,.by.purchasing.individualised.protection.of.their.property.rights.from.the.state.15.
However, that comes at a significant social cost: if politicians and bureaucrats.can.minimise. their.political. risks.by.selling.privately.such.public.
goods to a few individual firms in exchange of economic revenues, they have little.incentive.to.provide.the.public.at.large.with.open.access.to.these.goods..Therefore,. the. level. of. insecurity. of. property. rights. is. much. higher. for. the.
average firm and the ordinary citizen. Specific examples are state-owned enterprises.sold.at.low.prices.to.politicians.and.new.laws.designed.in.a.way.of.
favouring specific economic actors in a given sector at the expense of free and fair.competition.for.all.16.
Practices 
The practices of state capture had invoked the party involved to find the solutions.. Kaufmann. is. one. of. the. leading. researchers. in. these. matters.. His.
research basically made the basic ground for other researches to be held. World Bank. and. the. European. Bank. for. Reconstruction. and. Development. (EBRD).conducted. joint. initiative. to. form. The. Business. Environment. and. Enterprise.Performance.Survey.(BEEPS).17.The.results.of.the.survey.in.2002.showed.that.there.has.been.a.decline.in.state.
capture--significant in some cases--across the transition countries. The countries where.capture.was.most.pronounced--Russia,.Ukraine,.Azerbaijan,.and.Moldova--have.seen.the.sharpest.decline,.while.countries.with.more.modest.capture.levels,.for.example.in.some.south-eastern.European.countries,.have.remained.more.or.less.constant.or.have.experienced.an.increase.in.levels.of.capture.18.
. Russia9Practitioners.in.Russia.consistently.highlight..two.parallel.processes.taking.place.in.the.country:.state.capture.and.business.capture.(the.latter.being.used.
to describe the state unlawfully taking control and exercising undue influence over.businesses);.or.even,.as.described.by.some,.these.two.processes.have.been.turned.into.the.fusion.of.state.+.business.by.the.elite,.with.former.bureaucrats.
running businesses and business leaders holding or controlling political office. Amongst.the.key.measures.to.address.the.situation.are.the.introduction.of.
conflict of interest regulations, codes of conduct, and wide-ranging transparency reforms..In.addition,.it.has.now.been.acknowledged.by.many.that.to.galvanise.Russia’s.public.debate.over.corruption,.it.is.vital.to.remove.the.sole.responsibility.for. reform. from. the. government.. By. focusing. on. the. supply-side,. debate. can.lead.to.more.direct,.immediate.and.measurable.action,.particularly.in.areas.like.state.capture..Thus,.the.importance.of.engaging.the.business.community.in.the.process.is.being.increasingly.highlighted..
15.Anne.Lugon-Moulin..Loc..Cit.16.Ibid.17.http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml18. Donals. Bowser.. . Addressing. State. Capture. in. Russia/Ukraine/Central. Asia.. Anti-Corruption.Resource.Center.from.http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query18.cfm19.Ibid.
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a. Engaging The Business Community: Collective Action, Business Self-Regulation,
Etc.Earlier. this. year,. Russian. President. Vladimir. Putin. publicly. challenged.the. leaders. of. the. Union. of. Industrialists. and. Entrepreneurs. (RSPP). to. help.“destroy. the.breeding. ground. for. corruption.”.RSPP. is. a.business. association.
that includes the financial-industrial groups that secured control of a majority of.the.country’s.wealth.during.the.past.decade.of.privatisation..The.association.responded. by. creating. a.working. group. that.will. recommend. administrative.reform.measures.to.the.president,.which.will.include.reducing.obstacles.to.any.business.that.provides.the.opportunity.and.incentive.to.engage.in.various.forms.of.corruption,.including.state.capture.Notwithstanding. the. fact. that. civil. servants. play. a. role. in. both. state.and. business. capture,. the. breeding. ground. can. be. attacked. only. if. private.sector.leaders.take.initiative..There.are.numerous.market.incentives.for.RSPP.and.other.business. leaders. to. adopt. anti-corruption.practices..Those. include.enhancing.reputation.and.good.will.as.business.assets,. reducing. the.risk.and.costs. associated.with. capture,. strengthening. competitive. position,. increasing.shareholder.value,.and.gaining.access.to.capital.and.credit.on.better.terms..In.the. long-term,.RSPP. requires. institutions. that. can. govern. a.market. economy.built.on.true.competition..To.meet.Putin’s.challenge,.RSPP.should.take.concrete.initiatives. that. can. be. implemented. largely. by. the. supply. side.. In. particular,.RSPP.members.should.form.“integrity.pacts”.with.other.large.businesses,.SMEs,.and.non-governmental.organisations.(NGOs).at.the.national.and.regional.levels.designed.to.institute.conditions.for.transparent.and.fair.business.competition..The.most.concrete.form.of.an.integrity.pact.is.a.“no-bribery.pledge,”.under.which. companies. entering. a. government. tender. or. privatisation. bid. and. the.
officials responsible for choosing the winner commit to a transparent procedure. 
In particular, they pledge not to offer, pay, accept, or seek bribes of any kind during.the.tender..To.show.their.good.faith,.they.may.place.funds.in.escrow.that.they.would.relinquish.if.they.did.engage.in.bribery..If.a.business.does.not.abide.by.the.guidelines,. it.will. lose.the.bid.and.other.participants.in.the.pledge.can.stop.doing.business.with.(or.blacklist).it..Such.pacts.have.been.implemented.to.one.degree.or.another.throughout.the.world..To.maximise.impact.on.economic.growth,.RSPP.should.form.integrity.pacts.that.help.both.large.enterprises.and.SMEs..RSPP. leaders. should. also. take. initiative. in. regions.where. they. operate.their.factories.and.other.outlets..They.are.in.the.best.position.to.help.institute.local. programmes. to. monitor. government. agencies. and. budget. processes,.increase. access. to. information. regarding. allocation. of. public. resources,. and.foster. independent. oversight. of. public. procurement.. These. are. best. done.through.joint.coalitions.with.NGOs.and.watchdogs..RSPP.is.not.the.only.institution.engaging.in.the.process.of.private.sector-driven. initiatives. to.address.corruption.and.state.capture..Disproportionately.
injured by the extortion practices of officials at all levels, SMEs are already taking local.initiatives.throughout.Russia..Another.example.of.a.private.sector.initiative.is. the. formation---by.a.highly.regarded.economics.professor,.Lev.Kaplan,.and.the.General.Director.of.the.U.S..subsidiary.of.Otis.Elevator,.Vladimir.Marov--of.
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an. “Honest.Builders’. Club.”.The. coalition.dedicated. to. fair. business.practices.now.includes.30.of.the.largest.local.construction.companies,.various.NGOs,.and.the.city’s.Vice-Governor.for.Construction.The.Association.of.Minority.Shareholders’.Rights.assisted.the.Kremlin’s.
efforts to expose shady financial deals at Gazprom, 38 percent of which is owned by.the.state..Minority.shareholders.claimed.that.the.theft.of.vast.amounts.of.cash.
had kept share prices low and reduced profits. In December 2001, Gazprom’s 
new management decided to reclaim the Purgaz gas field, a valuable asset that was.previously.‘pawned.’.Since.the.new.management.arrived,.Gazprom.shares.have.risen.44.percent..The.Corporate.Behavioural.Code.is.one.example.of.Russia’s.determination.to. improve.corporate.governance.and.the. investment.climate..More.than.150.Russian. companies. were. consulted. in. the. course. of. developing. the. code.. It.includes.amendments.to.the.joint.stock.company.law,.securities.market.law,.the.criminal.law,.and.provisions.of.criminal.liability.in.cases.of.non-disclosure,.as.
well as measures for enforcement. While some are skeptical as to the genuine intentions,. it. is.widely.expected.to.seal.major. loopholes. in.existing.corporate.governance.structures..
b. Transparency Measures20Among. recent. concrete. measures. and/or. developments. aimed. at.improving.transparency.are:
On elections, Party Finance, and Lobbying RegulationsRussia. passed. a. law. on. the. election. of. deputies. to. the. State. Duma. in.
November 2002. While the basic provisions of the law remain the same as in the 
1999 version, it contains some new provisions concerned with finance, namely the. introduction.of. spending.caps,. stricter.regulation.of. funding.sources,.and.size. of. acceptable. donations.. A. law. on. the. presidential. election. was. passed.in. December. 2002. with. the. intention. to. streamline. a. hitherto. complicated.process..
Party financing and regulations remain as major issues for Russia in the 
context of state capture. Informal political actors--financial groups and political “oligarchs”--dominate.the.political.spectrum..Political.parties.are.included.into.the. structure.of. an. “oligarchy”. to.act. as. legitimate.vehicle. for. engagement. in.public.policy.and.lobbying..They.are.supported.by.their.own.controlled.mass.media.and.key.industries.
On access to Information Russia’s.federal.access.to.information.law.has.not.yet.passed.the.stage.of.parliamentary.debate.and.is.under.review.by.the.Duma.since.1996..Some.regions.and. local. entities. (including. Kaliningrad,. Greater. Novgorod). have,. however,.engaged. in. reform.with. the. goal. of.making. information. held. by. government.bodies.available.to.the.general.public..Generally.speaking,.access.to.information.is.not.considered.a.great.priority.by.politicians.and.the.civil.society.alike.in.a.context.in.which.the.state.is.still. largely.perceived.to.be.a.ruler,.rather.than.a.provider.of.public.services.
20.Ibid.
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2. UkraineIn. Ukraine,. the. dominant. motive. appears. to. be. revenge. against. the.
oligarchs who supported the old regime. Big businessmen identified with the new.regime.may.also.have.their.own.motives. . in.seizing.the.assets.of.the.old.
oligarchs. Again, a third goal is to level the playing field. Clearly, the two first objectives.contradict.the.third.one,.which.is.the.legitimate.goal..One.idea.is.that.the.privatisation.will.be.annulled,.compensation.will.be.paid.to.the.prior.owner.for.his.initial.payment,.and.then.the.enterprise.will.be.sold.anew.by.the.state.at.a.competitive.auction..The.redistribution.of.property.is.often.considered.as.one.of.the.characteristics.of.a.revolution.21.
On elections, Party Finance, and Lobbying Regulations22 Ukraine.has.adopted.a.number.of.laws.to.regulate.this.area,.among.them.the.2001.Law.on.Political.Parties,.the.1999.Presidential.Election.Law,.and.the.2001.Parliamentary.Election.Law..The.latter.is.considered.to.be.an.improvement.compared.to.the.previous.(1998/94).legislations.
Ukraine has introduced some specific measures on public disclosure of 
political finances, such as for example, the information on the size and sources 
of contributions to the funds of candidates, as well as publication of financial statements. indicating. the. use. of. those. funds.. . The.CEC. (the. central. electoral.body).has.to.publish.the.information.in.two.national.newspapers.within.seven.days.prior.to.the..elections..One. of. the. most. severe. problems. in. the. area. of. elections,. campaign.
financing, and regulation that has direct impact on the dynamics of state capture is.still..the.issue.of.funding.sources.for.political.parties..Ukrainian.fragmented.and. non-institutionalised. party. system. keeps. encouraging. big. businesses. to.form.client.circles.and.run.their.own.parties.to.directly.control.decision-making.processes.In.terms.of.Civil.Society-led.concrete.initiatives.in.this.area,.Transparency.International. (TI). national. chapter. (and. “Freedom. of. Choice. Coalition”).had. implemented. a. project. on. Public. Monitoring. of. Parliamentary. Electoral.Campaign.Financing.in.2002..
3. Central Asia23State. capture. does. not. necessarily. remain. stable. over. time.. In. many.
instances, efforts were focused at constructing well-functioning states early in the.transition.period.only.to.be..swamped.in.the.second.half.of.the.decade..For.some.countries,.it.is.a.question.of.whether.they.will.progress.or.regress.in.the.transition.to.democracy.and.to.a.market.economy..In.Central.Asia,.Kazakhstan.is.one.of.the.examples..
On elections, Party Finance, and Lobbying RegulationsKazakhstan. adopted. a. Law. on. Political. Parties. on. 26. June. 2002.. It.
introduced fundamental changes to the financial activities of political parties, 21.Anders.Aslund. (2005)..Comparative.Oligarchy:.Russia,.Ukraine.and. the.United.States..Center.for. Social. and. Economic. Research. from. http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_plik/4931074_SA%20296last.pdf22.Bowser..Loc..Cit.23.Ibid.
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including. their. sources. of. funding.. Potential. transparency. and. accountability.gains.are,.however,.contravened.by.the. inclusion.of.clauses. in. the. law.that. in.
turn directly affects the formation and operation of political parties, e.g. the requirement.of.a.minimum.50,000-membership.for.a.party.to.register.and.the.introduction. of. mechanisms. designed. to. enable. the. state. to. interfere. in. the.
internal affairs of political parties. 
On Access to InformationIn.Kazakhstan,.the.Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kazakhstan.(adopted.in.1995).guarantees.access.to.information.as.a.constitutional.right:.Everyone.shall.have.the.right.to.freely.receive.and.disseminate.information.by.any.means.not.prohibited.by.law..The.list.of.items.constituting.state.secrets.of.the.Republic.of.Kazakhstan.shall.be.determined.by.the.law..The.subsequent.law,.however,.“on.protection.of.state.secrets.of. the.Republic.of.Kazakhstan,”.which.“determines.legal.principles.and.the.single.system.of.protection.of.state.secrets.in.all.types.of.activity.of.state.executive.and.management.agencies,.enterprises,.institutions,.associations,.and.organisations,.irrespective.of.the.form.of.property,.as.well.as.of.military.units.and.citizens.of.the.Republic.of.Kazakhstan.on.the.territory.of.the.state.and.outside.of.it,”.is.rather.extensive.The.Kyrgyz.Republic.adopted.a.Law.on.the.Fight.against.Corruption.on.6.March.2003..Other.than.establishing.the.legal.and.organisational.foundations.for.
the fight against corruption in Kyrgyzstan, the law explicitly mentions the role 
of the media in investigating corruption offences and disseminating information regarding.the. latter.. It.also.establishes.provisions.for.government.agencies.to.publicise.information.relating.to.internal.corruption.matters..
On Conflicts of Interest and Disclosure
The term “conflicts of interest” did for the first time become a provision of. Kazakhstan’s. law. on. control. over. execution. of. national. and. local. budgets.enacted.in.2002..It.is.provided.for.as..any.activity.of.relations.which.is.capable.of.limiting.the.objectivity.and.the.independence.of.the.state.body.employees.in.terms.of.either.internal.or.external.control.A.Kazakh.governmental.decree.of.2000.establishes.that.all.civil.servants.
within a month of assuming office are obliged for the duration of their public 
service to transfer to confidential management any shares of participation in 
authorised capital of commercial organisations and other conflicting property 
and assets. Kyrgyzstan does not have any specific conflict of interest legislation, but.interestingly.it.is.regulated.as.an.aspect.of.corruption.by.the.standards.of.the.Criminal.Code..Finally,. an. interesting. governmental. body. is. under. discussion. for.establishment.in.Kyrgyzstan-the.National.Council.on.Faithful.Management..Its.main.tasks.are.inter.alia.to.include.taking.steps.to.eliminate.the.unwarranted.and.needless.interference.of.the.state.structures.into.the.economy.and.commercial.entities..
State Capture in IndonesiaTaking. the. role. as. Putin. already. had. is. Indonesian. President. Susilo.
Bambang Yudhoyono. When elected as the sixth president of the country, he 
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introduced the integrity pact for his cabinet. Candidates for any ministry office must. sign. their. . commitment. to. avoid. corruption. according. to. the. code. of.conduct.24.This.action.might.relate.to.the.history.of.Indonesia.under.the.Suharto.regime.. The. Suharto. government. may. have. never. intended. to. give. grief. to.Indonesia,.but.alas.after.ruling.for.almost.32.years,.it.had.established.itself.as.a.corrupt.regime..After.that,. Indonesia. forced.to.embark.on.a.comprehensive.and.unprecedented.process.of.decentralisation,.devolving--almost.overnight--enormous.responsibilities.to.regional,.provincial,.and.local.governments..In.spite.of.considerable.achievements,.the.Indonesian.decentralisation.process.continues.to.face.major.challenges.of.state.capture.by.the.local.elites,.a.deeply.entrenched.patronage.system,.and.widespread.petty.and.bureaucratic.corruption..The. greater. the. achievement,. the. greater. the. risk. involved.. The.emergence. of. stronger. civil. society. and. a. free. media. constitute. promising.trends. that.combined.with. further.reforms.aimed.at.promoting. transparency.and. community. participation,. as. well. as. reinforcing. upward. and. downward.accountability.mechanisms..It.could.ensure.that.decentralisation.fully.yields.the.
intended benefits.TI. in. accordance.with. Anti. Corruption. Resource. Centre25. tries. to. fully.understand.the.nature.of.corruption.challenges.at.the.local.level..In.query,.they.said. that. it. is. important. to. analyse. the. successes. and. failures.of. Indonesia’. s.unprecedented. decentralisation. process,. that. transferred. rapidly. complete.responsibility.for.most.public.services.to.the.sub.national.level..The.fast.transition.
from a highly centralised to a largely decentralised system has created specific 
accountability challenges that significantly affect corruption risks at the local level..
1. DefinitionsTodung.Mulya.Lubis.(2009),.senior.advocate.practising.in.Indonesia,.said.that.Lapindo’s.mud.case.in.Sidoarjo.is.an.example.of.state.capture.corruption..An. activist. for. Transparency. International. Indonesia. (TII),. Lubis. surely.knows.enough.about.corruption.practices..He.said. that. the.Lapindo.case. is.a.manifestation.of.state.capture.corruption.. Furthermore,. in. media26. he. explained. that. state. capture. corruption.
happens if there are some parties that may gain benefits from government policy.. Indication.to.the.fact.can.be.seen.in.this.case.when.the.party. involved.never.took.the.responsibility.for.the.disaster..The.policy.endorsed.by.Indonesian.
government to take responsibility for Lapindo mud flow victims has illustrated how.businesses.may.shift.a.policy.against.public.interests.
 What makes state capture possible according to David Kupferschmidt (2010). from. International. IDEA. is. the. existence. of. a. well-organised. and. a.well-funded. interest;. in. the. case.of. Indonesia,. the.powerful. business. groups..Their. control. of. large.media. groups,. combined.with. weak. law. enforcement,.
24.Calon.Menteri.harus.tanda.tangani.komitmen.anti-korupsi.(2009)..Antaranews.com.from.http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1255836656/calon-menteri-tanda-tangan-anti-korupsi25.Marie.Chene.(2009)..Corruption.Challenges.at.Sub-National.Level.in.Indonesia..Anti-Corruption.Resources.Center.from.http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=21026.Todung:.Kasus.Lapindo.adalah.“state.capture.corruption.(2009)..Antaranews.com.from.http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1251382626/todung-kasus-lapindo-adalah-state-capture-corruption
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contributes.to.establishment.of.a.conducive.environment.to.state.capture.27.. State. capture. can. be. described. as. “investment”. in. political. parties.
through political financing or bribery in law enforcement agencies, combined 
with the utilisation of mass media to influence public opinion and policy making. 
It allows powerful interest groups to use their abundant financial resources  to 
halt the opportunities for gaining economic, legal, and social benefits.28... Colombian.economist.Luis.Jorge.Garay,.under.the.concept.of.Co-opted.
State Reconfiguration, asserted  that the action of legal and illegal organisations, 
through illegitimate practices, seek to systematically modify from within the 
political regime and influence the formation, modification, interpretation, and 
application of the rules of the game and public policies. These practices are 
undertaken with the purpose of obtaining sustained benefits and ensuring that 
their interests are validated politically and legally, as well as gaining social 
legitimacy in the long run, although these interests do not follow the founding 
principle of social welfare”.29.. The.Corruption.Eradication.Commission.(KPK),.which.has.been.under.
constant attack from the police, the attorney-general office, and parliament members.for.the.last.couple.of.years,.remains.as.one.of.the.last.rampant.against.the.impunity.sought.by.state.capturers..The.Indonesian.political.party.system.is.characterised.by.a.growing.individualisation.of.weak.leadership.and.by.the.inability.of.political.parties.to.identify.the.champion.core.of.constituent.groups.and.to.articulate.policy.programs.. The reality of Indonesia’s politics is that liberalised elections are extremely 
costly for political parties. In a country with enormous and demographically 
heterogeneous characteristics, winning elections requires both securing access 
to financial resources, and strengthening the presence and visibility of political 
parties at the local level to mobilise voters. Incumbent leaders clearly have a 
competitive advantage on both fronts due to their influence on local budgets, their 
ability to help businesses with close ties to political parties, and their ability to use 
state resources to build strong support bases, particularly through the allocation 
of social funds to mass organisations.30 
 In its press release, TII concluded that the financing of local elections is the.root.of.political.corruption.and.state.capture.at.the.regional.level..Besides.its.direct.impact.on.state.resources,.it.raises.more.fundamental.issues.related.to.political.leadership,.the.strengthening.of.Indonesia’s.political.party.system,.and.public.trust.towards.democracy.. Soekarno,.the.Founding.Father.of.Indonesia.had.already.addressed.this.issue.in.BPUPKI.on.1.June.1945,.“We are building a Nation for all. Not for one 
person, not for one class, not for aristocrats, nor for the rich, but for all.”. This.cannot.happen.if.the.electoral.process.is.rigged.by.money.politics..One.of.the.biggest.challenges.associated.with.decentralisation.is.the.risk.of.state.capture.by.the.local.elite.
 With decentralisation, local elite and politicians suddenly gain 
access to regional resources they can divert to benefit influential groups and 
individuals whose money or votes count rather than the public at large. When 
27.Money.Politics.and.State.Capture. (2010)..Transparency. International. Indonesia. from.http://www.ti.or.id/en/index.php/press-release/2010/11/11/money-politics-and-state-capture28.Ibid.29.Ibid.30.Ibid.
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civil.participation.in.local.government.is.low,.as.it.seems.to.be.the.case.in.most.Indonesian.provinces,31. there. is.a.greater.chance.of. interest.groups.and. local.elite.capturing.and.directing.resources.towards.their.own.priorities.rather.than.towards.poverty.alleviation.and.improved.service.delivery.
2. ModesThere.are.several.types.of.state.capture.in.Indonesia:.32
Local networks of Patronage Across.the.country,..the.various.powers.of.the.state.tend.to.be.concentrated.in.the.village.elites.who.usually.maintain.close.and.personal.relations,.increasing.the.risks.of.collusion.between.key.stakeholders.to.pursue.vested.interests..This.
overlap of social and political functions and relations at the local level affects public-.and.private-sector.hiring.practices,.business.relationships,.and.awarding.of.contracts.with.widespread.practices.of.nepotism.and.cronyism..
Red tape and bribe extortion High.level.of.bureaucracy.provides.multiple.opportunities.for.rent-seeking.
at sub national level, with involved public officials having large discretionary 
powers as well as monopoly over these procedures. Bribes paid by firms  mostly arise. from. red. tape,. particularly. in. permits. and. licenses. imposed. by. local.
government officials. Research indicated that red tape and bribe extortion tend to. decrease. in. better. funded. localities. and.with. increased. education. of. local.
officials.33.
Lack of local capacityCorruption. risks. are. further. increased. by. the. lack. of. capacity. of. local.governments.to.manage.increased.responsibility.and.powers..Local.governments.often.lack.the.human.and.material.resources.to.perform.government.duties.in.a.transparent.and.accountable.manner.as.well.as.the.operational.and.economic.
capacity to run competitive and efficient public services. 
Misuse of local public resources 
In many local regions, levels of local corruption strongly affect the efficiency of.public.spending.on.service.delivery.and.the.enactment.of.inconsistent.local.regulations.governing.local.budgets.by.national.and.regional.parliaments..Those.
can be magnified with the lack of local capacity to review budget documents and. to. monitor. budget. formulation. and. execution.. Such. have. opened. many.opportunities.for.corruption.and.misuse.of.public.resources.34..
Public procurementLocal.procurement.is.another.area.especially.vulnerable.to.corruption.due.to.the.persistent.culture.of.favours.and.patronage.at.the.local.level..As.a.result,.31.Chene..Loc..Cit...32.Ibid.33.J..Vernon.Henderson.and.Ari.Kuncoro.(2004)..Corruption.in.Indonesia..Brown.University.from.http://www.pstc.brown.edu/henderson-kuncoro.pdf34.Daniel. Suryadarma. (2008).. Corruption,. Public. Spending,. and.Education.Outcomes:. Evidence.from.Indonesia.Research.School.of.Social.Sciences.The.Australian.National.University.
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local procurement offers many opportunities for corrupt practices, including collusion. of. suppliers,. bid-rigging,. bribes. and. kickbacks,. and. favouritism. in.contracts’.awarding.
Facilitation and other informal paymentsInformal. payments. remain. highly. pervasive. in. the. post. Suharto. era,.
including payments to speed up the issuance of certificates, permits, and licenses or.to.access.public.services.that.are.supposed.to.be.free.of.charge..Cutting.across.all.sectors.of.service.delivery,.there.are.also.opportunities.for.extorting.money.for.so-called.“services”.such.as.school.or.hospital.admissions,.shoes.or.school.uniforms. (that. are. sold.by. the. teachers),. private. tutoring,. or.bribes. for. good.grades.
Lack of efficient controls and oversight mechanismsIn.the.urge.to.move.away.from.the.old.autocratic.regime,.reforms.failed.
to establish effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that can hold local governments.accountable.to.the.central.government..Currently.existing.public.
mechanisms have not proven to be the most effective to uncover corruption 
cases in Indonesia. A World Bank study of 10 corruption cases in five Indonesian provinces. shows. that. almost. without. exception,. all. corruption. cases. had.been. uncovered. and. reported. by. NGOs,. community. groups,. social. activists,.
individual villagers, or affected parties rather than oversight, audit, or justice institutions.35
Culture of impunityIndonesia’s. long. tradition. of. authoritarian. rule. has. left. a. legacy. of.impunity.for.perpetrators.of.corruption,.which.combined.with.weak.protection.of. whistleblowers;. This. provides. fertile. ground. for. rent-seeking. behaviours..Sanctions.have.been. rarely. enforced,.which. tends. to.make. corruption. a. low-
cost and high-benefit activity, with little likelihood of redress. The traditional hierarchical.structure.of.local..villages.also.limits.the.propensity.of.citizens.to.question.those.in.power..In.addition,.at.the.village.level,.citizens.appear.to.have.little.awareness.of. their.rights.and.entitlements,.as.well.as.of. legal.processes.and.resources.36.
Lesson LearnedCorruption. is. a. political. problem. that. will. require. strong. political.commitment..It.cannot.be.solely.resolved.with.institutional.reform..Additional.
efforts and resources should be directed to strengthen political accountability. Thus,. by. empowering. civil. society. and. constituency. groups. to. demand.
accountability, we can earn a public policy that does not benefit  vested interests at.the.expense.of.public.interests.and.people’s.welfare.
35 Taufik Rinaldi, Marini Purnomo and Dewi Damayanti (2007). Fighting Corruption in Decentralized Indonesia.Case.Studies.on.Handling.Local.Government.Corruption.from..http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/corruption_exec_sum_en.pdf..36 Andrea Woodhouse (2005). Village Corruption in Indonesia Fighting Corruption in Indonesia’s Kecamatan.Development.Program..Indonesian.Social.Development.Paper.No..6.
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The. international. development. community. has. an. important. role. in.supporting.the.development.of.a.strong.and.critical.civil.society..Many.countries.began.transition.as.weak.states.unable.to.provide.basic.public.goods.and.with.
sets of powerful incumbent firms (these were predominantly state owned and newly.privatised).dominating.their.respective.markets.without.having.to.resort.to.bribery.payments..To.compete.in.such.an.environment,.new.entrants.adopted.a.strategy.of.
state capture to buy greater security for their property rights from public officials and.to.encode,.or.incorporate,.competitive.advantages.into.the.emerging.legal.and.
regulatory framework. Thus, state capture  became a strategy for a few firms to create. zones. of. relative.security. and. advantage.for. themselves. at. the.expense. of. all. other.
firms. In. high-capture.
economies, captor firms grow. more. than. twice.
as fast as other firms. In sharp. contrast,. captor.
firms appear to enjoy few. advantages. in. low-capture. economies,.where. such. grand.corruption. looks. more.like. a. survival. strategy.for. poorly. performing.
firms.37.Transparent. governance. reforms. are. therefore. highly. needed. to. better.share. the. power. in. the. society,. both. horizontally. and. vertically,. and. to. put.
in place very clear conflict of interests rules. State institutions should have 
safeguards to prevent them from being “owned” by specific individuals enjoying a.high.discretionary.power.38..On.the.other.hand,.a.vocal.civil.society,.provided.that.basic.civil.liberties.
are ensured, will point at governance deficiencies, call for better accountability, and.responsiveness.from.the.side.of.the.government..New.incentives.ought.to.be.found..to.possibly.instil.a.behaviour.change.in.those.actors.International.pressure.or.reward.(such.as. joining.the.European.Union).can.be.a.very.powerful.tool,.as.demonstrated.in.the.case.of.the.new.EU.member.states,. which. have. undertaken. major. and. rapid. endeavours. in. the. realm. of.governance..to.reach.the.goal.of.entering.the.EU.39.
The efforts of firms to influence the legal, policy, and regulatory environment. wherein. . they. operate. constitute. a. normal. and. indeed. healthy.
process that is common to all countries. What distinguishes such interactions 
in the capture economy is exclusion. Some firms enjoy exclusive privileges 
37.Hellman.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.38.Anne.Lugon-Moulin..Loc..Cit.39.Ibid.
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to influence decisions of the state while others are systematically excluded, 
enabling state officials to make choices that concentrate benefits on those with access.at.a.high.cost.to.those.who.are.excluded..Although. the. general. remedies. for. such. problems—transparency. and.
competition—are, by now, increasingly acknowledged, the specific ways in which reform.of.state.capture.can.be.achieved.are.less.obvious..Mobilising.the.losers.in.the.capture.economy—small.and.medium-sized.enterprises,.consumers,.and.other.interest.groups—and.enhancing.their.collective.voice.to.counterbalance.
the captors can have a catalytic effect in weakening the foundation of the capture economy.40.An. important. reform. instrument. that. is. increasingly.used.by. the.more.competitive. sectors,. the. disenfranchised,. non-governmental. organisations,.and.others.working.to.combat.state.capture.is.the.power.of.data..Furthermore,.policies.that.encourage.market.entry,.which.might.be.overlooked.by.the.existing.captors,.are.particularly.important..Over.time,.more.and.more.“smaller.oligarchs”.
may emerge to compete for influence and dissipate the rents for state capture.
1. Corruption As Crime“The cartels have not yet corrupted the government’s senior levels, but 
sooner or later they will, because they have millions of dollars and you need to be 
a saint to reject them.”41.Since.time,.both.legitimate.and.illegitimate.businesses.have.been.attempting.to.distort.or.displace.the.state.for.its.own.gain..In.many.contexts,. organised. criminal. groups. have. become.major. contenders. in. these.
efforts, engaging significantly at the intellectual, political, and institutional level with.state.and.social.actors..Until.recently,.organised.criminal.activity.was.constrained.within.a.state’s.
borders or limited to a small number of global cartels and mafia groups. However, the.end.of.Communism.coupled.with.the.expansion.of.global.markets.and.the.rising.sophistication.of.information.communications.technology.have.spurred.mass.expansion.of.organised.crime.In. the. course. of. expanding. their. operations,. transnational. organised.crime.groups.and.networks.have.sought.to.gradually.weaken,.co-opt,.disable,.privatise,.or.usurp.the.functions.of.governmental.agencies,.political.and.judicial.institutions,.and.the.state.itself..In.contrast.to.other.illicit.means.of.interaction.
with the state such as ‘influence’ or ‘administrative corruption,’ organised criminal.groups.often.seek.to.“prevent.the.law.from.being.enforced.altogether”.leading.to,.or.further.ensconcing.a.culture.of.impunity..
In many states across the globe, politicians and public officials are perceived (and.have.often.been.found.to.be).as.part.of.illicit,.elite,.and.corrupt.networks..Over.time,.this.has.resulted.in.increasing.public.mistrust.of.parliamentarians,.public. servants,. and. state. institutions,. often. leading. to. a.waning. respect. for.authority.and.the.rule.of.law,.and.decreased.institutional.legitimacy.Despite.the.vast.body.of.literature.on.these.issues.and.the.huge.sums.of.money. invested. in. developing. policy. and. operational. responses. to.meet. the.challenges. that. organised. criminals. and. corrupt. politicians. and. other. state.
actors pose, significant challenges remain.40.Hellman.and.Kaufmann..Loc..Cit.41.Center.on. International.Cooperation.(2011)..Seminar.on.Organized.Crime.and.State.Capture,.Meeting.Report..New.York.University.from.http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/Lima%20Seminar%20Background%20Paper.pdf
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During. the. 1990s,. law. enforcement. agencies. in. Europe. developed. a.
number of operational definitions of the phrase “organised criminal group.” 
Those definitions agree on the following crucial elements: such a group is 
structured, has some permanence, commits serious crimes for profit, uses 
violence, has corrupt officials, launders criminal proceeds, and reinvests in the licit.economy.42.
While state capture is often practiced by private actors, it also can be practiced.by.people.within.the.government,. in.alliance.with.private.actors.or.
not. Illicit political finance facilitates corruption and other means of effectively privatising.–.through.bribes,.intimidation,.and.violence.–.vital.state.functions,.federal. and. local. agencies,. members. of. parliament,. political. parties,. key.government.actors,.local.governments,.and.state.territory.43.State. capture. aims. at. systematically. distorting. or. displacing. the. state.
through a clandestine parallel entity or entities, and may be classified as the most. pernicious. manifestation. of. political. corruption.. State. capture. is. to. be.distinguished. from. petty. corruption;. it. is.manifested. as.meta-corruption,. or.
grand corruption, in which illicit political finance is used to systematically control.public.institutions.
While the phenomenon of state capture also takes place within non-democratic.governments,.it.can.be.argued.that,.except.in.rare.cases,.non-democratic.governments. are. examples. of. comprehensive. state. capture,.whether. by. clans,.organised. crime. networks,. armies,. militias,. liberation. movements,. oligarchs,.multinational.corporations,.foreign.governments,.or.a.combination.thereof.Crime.and.corruption.do.not.always.co-exist,.share.the.same.determinants,.or.respond.to.the.same.strategies.and.measures..A.corrupt.and.authoritarian.police.state.can.control.common.crime,.as.in.North.Korea..Conversely,.common.crime. can.be. a. challenge. to. countries.with. satisfactory. anti-corruption. track.records,.like.Chile.44.Crime. rates. tend. to. be. higher. where. there. is. high. unemployment,.high. socio-economic. inequality,. and. lax. gun. laws.. Corruption. thrives. where.civil. liberties,. free. press,. transparency,. and. contestable. politics. are. absent..Functioning.rule-of-law.matters.for.controlling.both.crime.and.corruption;.but.
again differences emerge: an independent judiciary is crucial for combating 
political corruption and an effective police is important for fighting petty corruption.as.well.as.common.crime..
There are also differences between the determinants of common  and organised. crime,. since. the. latter. does. relate. to. corruption.more. closely—for.
instance, drug traffickers and underground arms dealers thrive in collusion with.corrupt.authorities.in.weak.states..Unfortunately,.most.of.the.research.on.
corruption focuses on developing countries. When corruption indices measure cruder.forms.of.corruption,.such.as.bribery,.they.mask.one.of.the.most.serious.governance.challenges.facing.countries.like.the.United.States.today—so-called.legal.corruption.and.state.capture.by.powerful.corporations.
42. Edgardo. Buscaglia. and. Jan. van. Dijk. (2003).. Controlling. Organized. Crime. and. Corruption. in.the.Public.Sector..Forum.on.Crime.and.Society.Vol.3.No..1.and.2.from.http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/forum/forum3_Art1.pdf43.David.Kupferschmidt.(2009)..Illicit.Political.Finance.and.State.Capture..International.IDEA.from.http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/IDEA_Inlaga_low.pdf44.Daniel.Kaufmann.(2010),.Breaking.the.Cycle.of.Crime.and.Corruption?.Brookings.from.http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0414_corruption_crime_kaufmann.aspx
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The strategies to combat different manifestations of crime and corruption 
will differ from each other, and must be tailored to country context. To combat common.crime,.it.is.important.to.focus.on.shared.socio-economic.progress.and.
reduced unemployment among the youth, police effectiveness, and effectivegun banamong.civilians..To.address.legal.corruption.and.state.capture,.reforms.in.
transparency, as well as restrictions on corporate political finance and lobbying is.needed..Yet.crime.and.corruption.do.share.important.aspects.in.common..To.be.prepared. to. take. on.powerful. vested. interests. and. to. address. the. challenges.of. money. in. politics,. political. will,. leadership,. and. integrity. are. required. at.
the top. Some examples of strategic uses of illicit political finance used toward state.capture.are.cursorily.outlined.in.the.following,.as.yet.crude.and.tentative,.table.45.
45.Kupferschmidt..Loc..Cit.
Afghanistan  ‘Warlords’  Poppies, heroin  Politicians, army, border 
control  
Regional  
Bulgaria  ‘Organised crime’  Opaquely-privatised  Key institutions: customs,  National  
 consisting of former 
and  
industries, trafficking  judiciary, media, etc.   
 current state security  ±(of women), taxes    
 
agents 
    
Burma  Army  Drugs, industries  The state  National  
  controlled by army    
Colombia  Drug cartels,  Drugs  Legislature, political  Local control, with FARC  
 guerrillas (ELN,   parties, judiciary, police,  increasingly pushed into  
 FARC), Paramilitary 
Organisations  
 border  remote areas  
Guatemala  
Elements of the Army 
and  
Cocaine  Institutions that might  National  
 former secret services   
impinge on or facilitate 
trafficking 
 
 
Guinea-
Bissau  
Drug traffickers  Cocaine, foreign aid  Institutions that might 
impinge on or facilitate 
drug trafficking  
National  
High-conflict  Armies (domestic and  
Natural resources, 
foreign  
 Regional  
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2. Strategy For Combating Corruption The.standard.advice.for.combating.corruption.has.traditionally.focused.on. measures. to. address. administrative. corruption. by. reforming. public.
administration and public finance management. But with the increasing recognition.that.the.roots.of.corruption.extend.far.beyond.weaknesses. in.the.capacity.of.government,.the.repertoire.has.been.gradually.expanding.to.target.broader. structural. relationships,. including. the. internal. organisation. of. the.political. system,. relationships. among. core. state. institutions,. the. interactions.
between the state and firms, and the relationship between the state and civil society.46.
Increasing political accountability:As. political. accountability. increases,. the. costs. to. politicians. of.making.
decisions that benefit their private interests at the expense of the broader public interest. also. increase..Two.of. the.key. instruments. for. strengthening.political.accountability.are:.(i).increasing.the.transparency.of.decisions.made.by.public.
officials and (ii) increasing competition. through. organisations. that. provide.broad. constituencies. with. vehicles,. such. as. mass-based. political. parties,. for.expressing.their.collective.demands.
 Strengthening institutional restraints within the state:The.institutional.design.of.the.state.can.be.an.important.mechanism.in.
checking corruption,  particularly, the effective separation of powers among state.entities.with.each.operating.as.a.check.on.the.abuse.of.power.by.the.others..Strengthening.and.raising.the.credibility.of.the.judicial.system.by.enhancing.the.independence.and.accountability.of.judges.and.matching.functions.with.budget.and.capacity.are.particularly.important.
46 The World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition A Contribution to the Policy Debate from http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/17506/contribution.pdf
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Strengthening civil society participation:As. stakeholders. in. the. quality. of. governance. and. as. intermediaries.for. communication. between. the. populace. and. the. institutions. of. state,. the.organisations. that. comprise. civil. society. can. be. essential. in. constraining.corruption..Recently,.there.has.been.an.emergence.of.greater.civil.society.activism.regarding. corruption. throughout. the. region,. focused. especially. on:. creating.public.awareness.about.corruption.and.the.need.to.control.it,.formulating.action.
plans to fight corruption, and monitoring government behaviour. 
Fostering an independent media:Free.and.open.media.help. check. the. level. of. corruption.by.uncovering.and.shedding.light.on.abuses..Yet.the.promise.of.a.free.press.has.not.yet.been.fully.realised.in.many.transition.countries..A.policy.of.openness,.formalised.in.laws. guaranteeing. free. access. to. information,. strengthens. tools. for. oversight.and.enlists.the.media.as.an.ally.in.controlling.corruption.
Creating a competitive private sector:A.state.is.most.vulnerable.to.capture.when.economic.power.is.concentrated.
in a few firms or industries and when competing economic interests lack viable access.to.the.policymaking.process..The.ability.of.powerful.economic.interests.
to capture the state can be checked by reducing the benefits to these firms from capture..This.can.be.achieved.in.part.by.deepening.price.and.trade.liberalisation,.
increasing transparency in the ownership structure and operations of firms, and introducing.greater.competition.in.concentrated.sectors.by.lowering.barriers.to.entry.and.requiring.competitive.restructuring..
Reforming public sector management:
While strengthening mechanisms of external accountability is important, it. is.also.essential.to.strengthen.the.internal.management.of.public.resources.and.administration.to.reduce.opportunities.and.incentives.for.corruption..This.requires.instilling.meritocracy.and.adequate.pay.in.public.administration.In.combating.corruption.an.anti-corruption.strategy.is.needed:
Credible political leadership: A.serious.anticorruption.program.cannot.be. imposed.from.the.outside,.but.requires.committed.leadership.from.within,.ideally.from.the.highest.levels.of.the.state..
Diagnosing the nature and extent of the problem in each case: Implementing. surveys,. running.workshops,. and. developing. a. dialogue.with.institutions.of.civil.society.on.corruption.are.all.critical.for.gaining.country-
specific knowledge beyond the narrow limits of the typology. 
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Assessing the environment: 
The relevance and feasibility of specific reform instruments is closely linked. to. the.way. in.which.power. is.exercised,. the. level.of. informality. in. the.society,.and.the.extent.to.which.people.feel.trust.in.their.institutions.and.in.each.other..
Finding appropriate entry points: It.is.critical.to.begin.at.a.point.where.the.goals.are.feasible.and.tangible.results. can. be. realised. within. a. time. frame. that. builds. support. for. further.reforms.
Maximising leverage: 
Efforts should be made to design “win-win” anticorruption strategies that promote.the.interests.and.reputations.of.major.politicians.and.businesspeople.while. delivering. positive. externalities. such. as. enhancing. economic. growth,.strengthening.governance,.or.reducing.poverty.and.inequality..Based.on.some.researches.by.the.European.Bank.for.Reconstruction.and.Development.(EBRD). .there.is.no.close.correlation.between.changes.in.levels.
of capture and the introduction of high-profile anti-corruption programmes. The.same.can.be.said.for.administrative.corruption..However,..anti-corruption.programmes.may.take.a.while.to.have.an.impact.and..time.series.and.overall.number.of.observations.in.the.transition.region.can.be..too.limited.to.reach.any.
firm conclusion.47.
While the paradigm presented by Hellman and Kaufmann---of the actions 
of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence the. formation.of. laws,. regulations,.decrees,.and.other.government.policies. to.their. own. advantage. as. a. result. of. the. illicit. and. non-transparent. provision.
of private benefits to public officials---certainly has validity in defining the behaviour.of.political/economic.actors.in.many.countries.of.the.world,.it.does.
require a degree of refinement if it is to be applied to the entire Former Soviet Union.(FSU).region.
While there exists rampant corruption in the countries of the FSU and oligarchs. in.many. countries. have. seized. the. lion’s. shares. of. State. assets,. the.question.arises.as.to.who.is.capturing.who..Is.it.a.case.of.the.State.being.captured.by. the. private. sector. or. a. fusion. of. the. State. and. the. private. sector?. Putin.
already put it in quite a definite statement, “I only want to draw your attention 
straightaway to the fact that you have yourselves formed this very state, to a large 
extent through political and quasi-political structures under your control. So 
perhaps what one should do least of all is blame the mirror.”48.For.Indonesia,.the.data.released.by.TII.is.very.intriguing:49..
Decrease in state support to political partiesIn.75.per.cent.of.all.liberal.democracies.in.the.world,.the.state.provides.
financial assistance to political parties, with no significant differences between 47.Bowser..Loc..Cit.48 Vladimir Putin, in a meeting with Russia’s business leaders in July 2000 (Hoffman, 2000). from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm49.TII..Loc..Cit.
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old.and.new.democracies..India,.Switzerland,.New.Zealand.and.the.United.States.are.the.only.liberal.democracies.which.do.not.allocate.public.funds.for.political.parties..However,.even.in.some.of.these.countries,.state.support.is.available.for.individual.candidates.
Increasing electoral costs
Before 2004, political parties had to finance only one parliamentary 
campaign every five years, with executive officials elected afterwards by their respective. legislatures.. After. the. post-2004. reforms,.which. introduced.direct.elections. for. the. presidency,. governorships,. and. district. head. positions,. the.
number of popular ballots in any one district in a five-year cycle rose to a minimum.of.four.and.a.maximum.of.seven.
Impact on state budgets: development of ‘indirect state subsidiesFollowing.the.implementation.of.the.regulation.in.2005,.the.share.of.per.diems.and.other.allowances.in.public.budgets.skyrocketed,.with.an.increase.of.more.than.80per.cent.for.Parliament.Members..
Surge in political corruption150.gents.and.mayors.and.17.governors.have.been.jailed.since.2005.
Capture of political parties’ leadership by wealthy candidates : disruption of 
leadership and weakening of political lines of demarcations
In the 2005 local elections, party affiliation has played only a very marginal. role. in. the. nomination. process.. Although. parties. had. the. exclusive.right.to.nominate.candidates,.with.independents.barred.from.running,.only.22.
per cent of all nominees were party officials. The large majority was bureaucrats and.entrepreneurs,.with.36.and.28.per.cent.representation,.respectively;.39.8.per.cent.of.all.members.of.the.2004-2009.national.parliaments.were.business-people.
ConclusionPower.corrupts..absolutely..To.address.Lord.Acton.(1952).after.a.century.
seems fit to this matter. “It is easier to find people fit to govern themselves than 
people to govern others. Every man is the best, the most responsible, judge of his 
own advantage.”50..
Illicit aspects of governance may appear difficult to assess, as they are by nature.clandestine..However,.this.dark.side.of.public.life.is.not.unknowable,.and.various. scholars,.particularly.economists,. are.making. inroads. into.describing.
and measuring these phenomena. The World Bank and others are currently attempting. to. analyse. the. conditions. and. processes. by. which. state. capture.occurs,.and.to.measure.its.extent.
Kaufmann whowas the first  to research about state capture already explained. that. in. some. developing. countries. such. as. Indonesiathis. type. of.
corruption may not be referred to as state capture. Nonetheless the significant parties. in. the. country. that.are. involved. in. these.matters.already.address. the.50.Lord.Acton,.as.quoted.by.Himmelfarb.in.her.work,.Lord.Acton,.1952.(University.of.Chicago.Press,.1960).pp.172-3...from.http://blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Acton.htm
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issue. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) and Transparency International Indonesia.(TII).are.some.of.them..
In analysing  political financing regulations, TII addresses that such practices.could.actually.be.prevented.to.a.larger.extent.if.political.parties.were.
required to provide standardised financial reports in facilitating the audit of 
public accountants. This can go in three ways, as follows: first, by amending the. law.on.general. elections. to. challenge. the.Constitutional.Court’s.decision;.second,.by.limiting.the.donations.of.party.members;.and.last,.by.revising.the.law.on.political.parties.to.generalise.reporting.obligations.in.terms.of.corporate.and.individual.donations.outside.the.campaign.period.This.writing. is.merely. a. contribution. to. the. research. at. large.. . Due. to.the.global. form.of.corruption,.every.means. is.necessary..Hopefully,. this.piece.can.shed.some. light. into. the.growing.policy.dialogue.on.developing.practical.strategies. for. reducing. corruption.. As. more. and. more. countries. seek. to.implement.anticorruption.programs,. it. is. critical. for. the.other. institutions. to.continue.to.enhance.this.dialogue.with.both.the.lessons.of.experience.and.the.new.approaches.designed.to.tackle.the.roots.of.corruption.
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